Assess the extent to which both Israel and Egypt benefited from the Yom Kippur War.

From the military point of view, the Yom Kippur War was a victory for the Israelis. The Egyptian and Syrian leaders secretly prepared for war, and a surprise attack was launched against Israel on 6 October 1973, on the Jewish holy day, Yom Kippur. Saudi Arabia provided Egypt with financial support. Egyptian forces achieved notable early successes, but then the Israelis managed to gain the initiative, counterattack, and cut off the Egyptian Third Army. Both the United States and the Soviet Union were involved in the war; the Soviet Union sent arms to Egypt and Syria, and the United States organized an airlift to Israel. When the Israelis crossed the Suez Canal, US forces were put on nuclear alert, but both superpowers wanted to avoid a confrontation; they demanded a ceasefire which the UN supported. Kissinger engaged in shuttle diplomacy between 1973 and 1975.

The Sinai I accord, 1974, allowed the Egyptians to retain control of the Suez Canal, freed the Third Army, and drew a ceasefire line on the east side of the canal, with a buffer zone between the two forces; the canal reopened in 1975. Sinai II was signed in September 1975 calling for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from two strategic passes in the Sinai and some surrounding territory. Saudi Arabia began selling oil to the United States again. The fact that the Arabs had succeeded in surprising the Israel Defence Forces and inflicting heavy losses in the early part of the war was a traumatic experience for Israel. The public called for an enquiry and a commission, chaired by the president of Israel’s Supreme Court, concluded that Israeli intelligence had sufficient warning of the impending attack but failed to interpret the information correctly. The public blamed the Prime Minister, Golda Meir, and Defence Minister, Moshe Dayan. It was later revealed that the head of IDF intelligence made a critical error. Public outrage ultimately led Meir to resign.

However, it could be argued that the political victory belonged to Egypt. The Arab soldiers demonstrated that they could act together both in military planning and in the use of the oil weapon. Military involvement helped to restore Egyptian pride. Sadat aimed to move from the humiliation of 1967 to being in a strong position to negotiate peace. Israel had gained Sinai and Gaza from Egypt, the Golan Heights from Syria, East Jerusalem, and the West Bank from Jordan in 1967. Sadat also wanted to resolve the country’s economic problems. From 1968–1979, Israel and Egypt waged what became a war of attrition over the Suez Canal; reopening the canal would help to restore Egypt’s economy. He was determined to regain Sinai, promising his people a settlement with Israel. He was prepared to recognize the state of Israel to regain this land, but Israel refused to negotiate. He needed US involvement to force Israel into peace negotiations, but a weak Egypt would not be taken seriously. The war achieved his goals of restoring Egyptian pride. Sadat emerged from the war as a world leader and had improved Egypt’s standing in the world. He could now seek peace. In November 1977, he flew to Israel and informed the parliament that he was prepared to live in peace and security, but he also wanted a solution for the Palestinians. In the following month, Menachem Begin went to Egypt; peace talks began but slowed down. In 1978 President Carter invited the two leaders to Camp David. It was agreed that Israeli forces were to be withdrawn from Sinai and that Egypt was to regain the whole of Sinai within three years. Israel was to have free shipping through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran. In March 1979, the Treaty of Washington was signed, confirming the agreements reached at Camp David. The Palestinian problem still remained.