Hitler’s foreign policy between 1933 and 1941 followed a clear plan. Discuss.

The question of whether Hitler’s foreign policy between 1933 and 1941 followed a clear plan is a complex and heavily debated topic among historians. While some argue that Hitler pursued a pre-determined “master plan” leading inevitably to war, others believe he was an opportunistic pragmatist who reacted to events rather than shaping them. A third perspective suggests a compromise: Hitler possessed a clear vision, but was flexible enough to adapt to changing circumstances. This essay will examine evidence supporting each of these interpretations to determine the extent to which Hitler followed a coherent foreign policy plan.

Evidence for a master plan

Several pieces of evidence support the argument that Hitler operated from a pre-meditated "master plan." First, his writings, particularly Mein Kampf, clearly articulate his core foreign policy objectives: overturning the Treaty of Versailles, uniting all ethnic Germans in a Greater Germany, acquiring Lebensraum (living space) in Eastern Europe, and subjugating “inferior” races. These aims formed the bedrock of his ideology and guided his actions throughout his rule.

Furthermore, Hitler’s consistent pursuit of these goals across a series of events suggests a strategic approach. From his early pronouncements against the Treaty of Versailles to his withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933, Hitler demonstrated a willingness to challenge the existing international order. The reintroduction of conscription in 1935 and the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936 were further calculated risks that directly defied the Treaty. These actions, met with minimal resistance from appeasement-minded Britain and France, emboldened Hitler and confirmed his belief in Western weakness.

The Hossbach Memorandum of 1937 provides further support for the “master plan” theory. This document records Hitler outlining his vision for German expansion through war, aiming for conquest in the east by 1943-45. While some historians argue that this was merely a discussion document rather than a concrete plan, it nonetheless reveals Hitler’s aggressive ambitions and his belief in war as a means to achieve them.

Evidence for pragmatism and opportunism

However, other evidence suggests that Hitler was not above pragmatic decision-making and opportunistic exploitation of situations. His early successes in revising the Treaty of Versailles, such as the 1935 Anglo-German Naval Treaty and the 1938 Anschluss with Austria, relied heavily on exploiting the appeasement policies of Britain and France. By portraying himself as a reasonable leader seeking only to correct the injustices of the past, Hitler lulled the Western powers into complacency and bought himself valuable time to rearm and expand.

The 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact is frequently cited as an example of Hitler’s pragmatism. This non-aggression pact with his ideological arch-enemy, Stalin, secured his eastern border and allowed him to launch the invasion of Poland without fear of Soviet intervention. While some argue that this pact was a temporary tactical maneuver to achieve his ultimate goals in the east, as evidenced by the later invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, it nonetheless demonstrates Hitler’s willingness to prioritize strategic advantage over ideological purity.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the nature of Hitler’s foreign policy between 1933 and 1941 cannot be easily categorized as solely driven by a master plan or pure pragmatism. Evidence suggests a more nuanced approach. He undoubtedly held firm ideological beliefs and long-term goals, articulated in Mein Kampf and evidenced in his consistent actions to dismantle the Treaty of Versailles and expand German territory. He expertly manipulated international situations and exploited the appeasement policies of Western powers to his advantage. However, his willingness to make tactical decisions, as evidenced by the Nazi-Soviet Pact, demonstrates a degree of flexibility and opportunism in his approach. Therefore, it is most accurate to conclude that Hitler possessed a clear vision for Germany’s future but was not bound by a rigid master plan, adapting his tactics to exploit opportunities and overcome obstacles in pursuit of his ultimate objectives.

Bibliography
Weinberg, Gerhard L. *The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.
Shirer, William L. *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*. Simon & Schuster, 1990.
Kershaw, Ian. *Hitler: A Biography*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2008.