Stalin's Foreign Policy: Defense or Opportunism?

The assertion that Stalin's primary foreign policy objective was the defense of the Soviet Union from attack holds a degree of validity, yet it oversimplifies a complex and often contradictory reality. While safeguarding the USSR remained paramount, Stalin's actions, driven by pragmatism and opportunism, often transcended purely defensive motivations.

Stalin's shift from world revolution to "Socialism in One Country" undeniably prioritized the Soviet Union's security. Disillusioned with the Comintern's inability to spark global socialist uprisings, Stalin argued that fortifying socialism within Soviet borders was paramount. This ideological shift manifested in his foreign policy. The Comintern, once a tool for global revolution, was repurposed to safeguard the USSR. The condemnation of social democratic parties as "social fascists" ceased, replaced by efforts to build anti-fascist alliances, as seen in France and Spain. This pragmatism aimed to create a buffer zone against potential aggressors, primarily Nazi Germany.

Stalin's pursuit of collective security further underscores his defensive ambitions. Joining the League of Nations in 1934 and concluding mutual assistance pacts with France and Czechoslovakia in 1935 demonstrate a clear attempt to forge alliances against growing German aggression. However, the Munich Conference of 1938 shattered any illusions of collective security. The appeasement of Hitler by Britain and France exposed the hollowness of their commitments, leaving Stalin to re-evaluate his options.

The subsequent Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939, while seemingly contradictory to a defensive strategy, highlights Stalin's pragmatic approach. Despite years of animosity, negotiations with Germany, advocated by figures like Molotov, persisted. Stalin, ever the pragmatist, remained open to any agreement beneficial to the Soviet Union. The pact provided a temporary respite from war, allowing Stalin to strengthen the Soviet military and expand territorially into Poland and the Baltic states, as exemplified by the Soviet invasion of Poland in September 1939. The pact served Stalin's short-term defensive needs while simultaneously advancing Soviet interests.

However, Stalin's foreign policy was not solely driven by the defense of the Soviet Union. His actions in the Far East, particularly concerning China and Japan, reveal a more opportunistic approach. The conflicts with China over the Manchurian Chinese Eastern Railway in 1929 and the Soviet invasion of Xinjiang in 1934 demonstrate Stalin's willingness to use force to secure Soviet interests. The subsequent shift to a Non-Aggression Pact with China in 1937, fueled by deteriorating relations with Japan after their invasion of Manchuria and the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany, exemplifies Stalin's adaptability and prioritization of Soviet power over ideological commitments.

In conclusion, while the defense of the Soviet Union remained a cornerstone of Stalin's foreign policy, it was not his sole objective. Driven by pragmatism, opportunism, and a desire to secure Soviet interests, Stalin's actions often transcended purely defensive motivations. From the realpolitik of the Nazi-Soviet Pact to his maneuvering in the Far East, Stalin proved himself a ruthless pragmatist willing to exploit opportunities and forge alliances, however uncomfortable, to advance Soviet power and safeguard his own regime.