Japan’s status as a Great Power was confirmed by the Paris Peace Settlement. How far do you agree?

The Paris Peace Settlement, encompassing the Treaty of Versailles and other agreements, undoubtedly elevated Japan's international standing. However, arguing that it single-handedly "confirmed" Japan's Great Power status necessitates a more nuanced examination. While the settlement bestowed tangible benefits and recognition upon Japan, it simultaneously exposed limitations and sowed the seeds of future discontent, revealing a more complex reality than outright confirmation.

Undeniably, World War One provided Japan with a springboard to exert its influence. Allied with the victorious powers, Japan seized German holdings in the Pacific and China, demonstrating its military prowess. As a burgeoning industrial power, Japan profited from wartime production, shifting from a debtor to a creditor nation (Duus, 2014). This newfound economic clout, coupled with its military actions, bolstered Japan's claim to Great Power status, a claim seemingly acknowledged at Paris.

Japan's inclusion among the "Big Five" at the Paris Peace Conference, securing a permanent seat on the League of Nations Council, offered tangible recognition of its elevated global stature. The transfer of German rights in Shandong and the Pacific Islands further solidified Japan's position in Asia and the Pacific (Beasley, 2000). These gains, achieved through the peace process, could easily be interpreted as confirmation of Japan's Great Power status.

However, the reality within the halls of Versailles presents a more complex picture. Negotiations were dominated by the “Big Three” – Britain, France, and the United States – with Japan relegated to a secondary role. This exclusion from the core decision-making process, despite its contributions to the Allied victory, fueled a sense of resentment and inequality. The rejection of Japan’s proposed “racial equality clause” further exemplifies this disparity (Shimazu, 1998). Though widely supported, Western opposition, particularly from the United States and Australia, ultimately quashed the proposal, highlighting the racial prejudice underpinning the international order and undermining Japan's claim to equal footing among the Great Powers.

While the Washington Naval Conference recognized Japan’s naval power, it also imposed limitations that fueled resentment. The acceptance of a lower ratio of capital ships compared to the US and Britain, coupled with the obligation to withdraw troops from Shandong and Siberia under the Nine-Power Treaty (Iriye, 1999), underscored the West’s attempts to contain Japan’s growing influence. While these concessions offered short-term advantages, they fueled a narrative of Western constraint and Japanese exceptionalism, ultimately contributing to the rise of militarism in the following decades.

In conclusion, while the Paris Peace Settlement undoubtedly elevated Japan's international standing and provided tangible gains, it fell short of unequivocally "confirming" its Great Power status. The exclusion from key negotiations, the rejection of the racial equality clause, and the limitations imposed by the Washington Naval Conference underscored the West's reluctance to accept Japan as a true equal. These slights and constraints, perceived as injustices, fostered resentment and a sense of exceptionalism within Japan, ultimately contributing to the volatile international climate of the 1930s. Therefore, it is more accurate to argue that the Paris Peace Settlement presented a double-edged sword: it acknowledged Japan's rising power while simultaneously exposing the limitations and prejudices that would ultimately contribute to future conflict.