Kennedy’s foreign policy was a disastrous failure.’ Assess the validity of this view.

John F. Kennedy’s Presidency (1961-1963) coincided with a particularly intense period of Cold War tension. His short time in office saw a number of serious foreign policy crises, including the Bay of Pigs Invasion, the Berlin Crisis and the Cuban Missile Crisis. His assassination in November 1963 and the subsequent escalation of US involvement in Vietnam during Johnson’s presidency have led some historians to the conclusion that Kennedy’s foreign policy was a ‘disastrous failure’. This essay will assess the validity of that view.

There is no doubt that Kennedy made some serious miscalculations in the field of foreign policy. The Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961, just three months into his presidency, was a fiasco. The plan, formulated under Eisenhower, was to land a group of Cuban exiles in Cuba with the aim of sparking an uprising against Castro’s communist regime. Kennedy approved the plan but scaled back US air support at the last minute. The invasion was a disaster. The exiles were poorly trained and equipped and were quickly defeated by Castro’s forces. The incident humiliated the United States and strengthened Castro’s grip on power. It also pushed Cuba closer to the Soviet Union.

The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 brought the world to the brink of nuclear war. The crisis began when the US discovered that the Soviet Union was building nuclear missile bases in Cuba, just 90 miles from the US mainland. Kennedy responded by imposing a naval blockade on Cuba and demanding that the Soviets remove the missiles. For several days the world held its breath as the two superpowers edged closer to conflict. Eventually, Khrushchev backed down and agreed to remove the missiles in return for a US promise not to invade Cuba. Whilst this has often been hailed as a victory for Kennedy – indeed, many credit him with saving the world from nuclear war – it could also be argued that Khrushchev emerged triumphant. Not only did he extract a promise from the US not to invade Cuba, thus guaranteeing Castro’s survival, but he also secured the removal of US missiles from Turkey.

Kennedy’s record in Vietnam is also often cited as evidence of foreign policy failure. Kennedy increased the number of US military advisers in Vietnam from 700 when he took office to 16,000 by 1963. He was also complicit in the coup which overthrew and led to the assassination of South Vietnamese President Diem in 1963. Diem was a corrupt and authoritarian leader but he was also a staunch anti-communist. His removal created a power vacuum in South Vietnam which the communists were able to exploit. Kennedy’s actions in Vietnam paved the way for the massive escalation of US involvement under Lyndon Johnson and the subsequent disaster of the Vietnam War.

However, it is too simplistic to label Kennedy’s foreign policy a ‘disastrous failure’. The Bay of Pigs invasion, whilst undoubtedly a serious error, did lead Kennedy to approach subsequent Cold War crises with more caution. In Berlin in 1961, he refused to be drawn into a confrontation with Khrushchev when the Soviets erected the Berlin Wall. His handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis was also widely praised, even if Khrushchev did also emerge with concessions. Kennedy’s ‘flexible response’ strategy, which emphasized the use of conventional forces and diplomacy rather than reliance on nuclear weapons, helped to prevent further Cold War escalation. He also made some progress in improving relations with the Soviet Union, signing the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963 which banned atmospheric nuclear tests.

Kennedy also deserves credit for his commitment to promoting democracy and development around the world. His “Alliance for Progress” initiative was designed to promote economic and social progress in Latin America. He also established the Peace Corps, which sent thousands of young Americans to developing countries to work on humanitarian projects. These initiatives, whilst not without their critics, did much to improve the image of the United States abroad.

In conclusion, whilst a superficial analysis of Kennedy’s foreign policy might appear to support the view that it was a ‘disastrous failure’, this is an overly simplistic argument. His record is a mixed one, characterized by miscalculations but also by notable successes. He learned from his mistakes and his more cautious approach in the wake of the Bay of Pigs invasion probably prevented the escalation of numerous other crises. Furthermore, his commitment to pursuing peaceful solutions, epitomized by the establishment of the Peace Corps, did much to foster international goodwill. The view that his foreign policy was a ‘disaster’ is therefore an unfair assessment.