Soviet Foreign Policy (1924–1941)

The Soviet Union's foreign policy from 1924 to 1941 was characterized by a constant tension between ideological aspirations and pragmatic considerations. While the Bolsheviks, under Lenin and later Stalin, remained committed to the ultimate goal of global revolution and the demise of capitalism, the practicalities of governing a fledgling socialist state in a hostile world necessitated a more nuanced approach.

Socialism in One Country: Following the failures of communist uprisings in Europe after World War I, coupled with the USSR's own internal weakness and the need to build a socialist economy, Stalin's doctrine of "Socialism in One Country" took hold. This pragmatic approach prioritized the security and development of the Soviet Union itself. A key element of this was the need to avoid international isolation and secure its borders. This led to a willingness to engage with capitalist powers, exemplified by the Treaty of Rapallo with Germany in 1922, which normalized relations and provided economic benefits. Similarly, trade agreements, such as the Anglo-Soviet trade agreement of 1924, were pursued for their economic advantages, even with ideologically opposed nations like Great Britain. This pragmatic approach also extended to relations with Nationalist China, demonstrating that ideological compatibility was subordinate to strategic considerations.

The Rise of Fascism and Shifting Priorities: The emergence of fascist regimes in Italy and Germany during the 1930s presented a new threat to the Soviet Union, forcing a reevaluation of its foreign policy. The Comintern's promotion of "United Fronts" with left-wing parties against fascism, championed by Litvinov, yielded mixed results. While it had some success, such as the Popular Front government in France (1936), it also led to increased international suspicion of Soviet intentions. The Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), where the USSR provided support to the Republicans, further fueled fears of Soviet-backed communist expansion, playing into the hands of fascist propaganda.

The Nazi-Soviet Pact and Realpolitik: With the failure to forge lasting alliances with the Western democracies and the growing threat from Nazi Germany, Stalin made a dramatic foreign policy shift. The Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939, a non-aggression pact with Hitler, stands as a stark example of realpolitik trumping ideology. This pact served several Soviet aims. Firstly, it provided a temporary respite from war with Germany, buying time for Soviet rearmament. Secondly, it allowed Stalin to regain territory lost after World War I, expanding Soviet borders westward into Poland and the Baltic states. This move aimed to create a buffer zone against potential German aggression. However, the pact also came at a heavy moral cost, signaling a willingness to abandon ideological allies, as evidenced by the handing over of German communists who had sought refuge in the USSR to the Nazi regime.

Conclusion
In conclusion, Soviet foreign policy between 1924 and 1941 was driven by a complex interplay of factors. While the ultimate goal of global revolution remained a distant aspiration, the immediate concerns of securing the Soviet state and promoting its interests took precedence. The shifts from pragmatic engagement with capitalist powers to attempts at building anti-fascist alliances and ultimately to the cynical realpolitik of the Nazi-Soviet Pact demonstrate the adaptability, and ruthlessness, of Soviet foreign policy in the face of a rapidly changing international environment. The Soviet Union under Stalin proved willing to compromise its ideological principles in the name of national security and self-preservation. The legacy of this period continues to shape our understanding of Soviet actions in the decades that followed.


Bibliography

Lynch, Robert. Stalin and Soviet Foreign Policy, 1928–1941. Indiana University Press, 2019.

Roberts, Geoffrey. The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Second World War. Routledge, 2018.